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Native American Oral Evidence: Finding a New
Hearsay Exception
Max Virupaksha Katner*
ABSTRACT

The Federal Rules of Evidence hearsay rules unjustifiably exclude
legitimate and trustworthy evidence that support many Native American legal
claims. Native American communities traditionally were not literate and
rarely recorded the treaties, contracts, and other legal instruments they drew
up or honored in any kind of written format, oftentimes recording their
histories and diplomatic events in other ways; take for example wampum belts
used by the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, among others. While the U.S. legal
system presupposes that evidence in written statements provides a greater
assurance of accuracy and truth than oral statements, this is not always the
case. Writing is as susceptible to forgery, revision, manipulation, and
misinterpretation as oral knowledge. Traditional Native American accounts
of past experiences and realities are not honored in the courtroom, which
strips authority from the robust institutions Native Americans employ in order
to pass down and collectively maintain their own bodies of knowledge. This
is a serious problem in Native American jurisprudence today.
This article compares the American legal system’s treatment of oral
evidence and history with its treatment in the legal systems of Canada, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and Norway. Each of these legal
systems has developed methodologies that enable it to admit oral evidence in
ways that respect the unique circumstances that often characterize disputes
arising between indigenous and non-indigenous people. Canada, for
example, has broadened its rules of evidence to admit First Nation (Canadian
Native American) oral histories and cultural knowledge at times, so that they
may be evaluated on par with Eurocentric written evidence. The InterAmerican Court similarly admits oral histories from indigenous parties,
expert witnesses, and anthropological studies, if it finds them legitimately
probative in the context of a legal dispute. Norway’s highest court, the
Høyesterett, critiqued its own historical treatment of legal disputes involving
Sámi land and cultural rights and began adopting Sámi-centric approaches
in its jurisprudence that reference Sámi lifestyle and custom. Canadian, InterAmerican, and Norwegian legal practices may have persuasive value in U.S.
courts deciding how to approach cases involving Native American parties
who seek to introduce knowledge and expertise that has not traditionally been
admitted in state and federal court systems. Failure to accommodate these
parties not only violates the trust doctrine that federal and state governments
are responsible to uphold for their relationship with sovereign indigenous
nations, but also perpetuate cycles of injustice Native Americans have
endured for the last 400 years. In the spirit of increasing access to the courts
and advocating for equal justice, U.S. jurisprudence should evolve to
* Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M. Class of 2020; Boston University
School of Law, J.D. Class of 2019.

2021

NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL EVIDENCE

21

consider the evidentiary value of modes of knowledge that many indigenous
societies historically developed and preserved to this day.
I. Admitting Native American Oral Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and state evidentiary rules
exclude hearsay, which is defined by FRE 801 as “a statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” Indigenous oral history statements fall squarely within this
definition, because past events recounted by word of mouth are not statements
originally made by the declarant in court under oath. The original declarant is
also not subject to cross-examination or observational scrutiny by the fact
finder, whether judge or jury. Yet indigenous oral history is not as unreliable
or prejudicial as many assume. The attitude of U.S. courts toward Native
American oral evidence is in stark contrast to its treatment in Canada, the
Inter-American Court, and Norway. This does not have to be the case. The
United States should adopt alternative approaches to indigenous oral history
evidence to ensure that indigenous communities receive equal and
nondiscriminatory access to the judicial system, to abide by the international
prerogative to uphold indigenous rights, and to honor the federal
government’s trust responsibility to Native American nations.1
The American legal system favors written over oral evidence. This
fundamental principle is reflected in the best evidence doctrine and the
prohibition of hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 The best evidence
rule originated in eighteenth century British law with the statement that
evidence is admissible if it is “the best that the nature of [a] case will allow.”3
On its face, the Federal Rules of Evidence adhere to the best evidence doctrine
by privileging original written documents as, without exception, more reliable
than subsequent copies or parol evidence of the content of a written
document.4 The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as statements made
by a declarant that were not made while testifying under oath at a trial or
hearing.5 Since the statements were made out of the courtroom, a lawyer
cannot test the validity or accuracy of hearsay by cross-examination.6 Because

1

See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (finding that the Federal
Government has full responsibility to manage Native American resources and land
on their behalf and for their benefit); Friends Committee on National Legislation,
The Origins of our Trust Responsibility Towards Tribes,
https://www.fcnl.org/updates/the-origins-of-our-trust-responsibility-towards-thetribes-132 (Sept. 29, 2010); U.S. Congress, American Indian Policy Review
Commission, Final Report of Task Force One, Trust Responsibilities and FederalIndian Relationship, including Treaty Review, § 7.
2
Fed. R. Evid. 802.
3
Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 33 (1745).
4
Fed. R. Evid. 1001-8.
5
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
6
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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of this, apart from thirty-six exceptions,7 courts generally do not allow hearsay
to be admitted into evidence.
An overlooked consequence of these doctrines and the primacy of
written evidence over oral evidence underlying both of them is an aversion to
the introduction of evidence that could vindicate the claims of indigenous
communities to ancestral land, cultural artifacts, sacred sites, etc.8 Oral
histories continue to play an important role in many Native American nations.
The diverse forms that Native American oral histories take include the
intangible such as songs, rituals, and ceremonies; oral histories may also be
referenced by tangible items such as totems, weavings, pottery, and
architecture.9 Oral histories inform how Native American nations maintain
cultural ties to their lands. The relationship that indigenous people have to
land they traditionally inhabit and use does not consist of mere economic
exploitation. Rather, indigenous communities, to a much greater degree than
non-indigenous people, share a bond with land that is crucial for their
physical, cultural, and spiritual well-being.10 For these communities, their
traditionally-used and inhabited lands inform their worldview and are a part
of their cultural identity.11
This connection is codified in multiple international treaty
instruments12 signed by the United States and in customary international law13
7

Fed. R. Evid. 803, 807. The very fact that the hearsay doctrine is subject to 36
exceptions and exemptions calls into question its categorical nature.
8
See generally Rachel Awan, Native American Oral Traditional Evidence in
American Courts: Reliable Evidence or Useless Myth?, 118 PENN STATE L. REV.
697 (2014).
9
Hope M. Babcock, “[This] I Know From My Grandfather:” The Battle for
Admissibility of Indigenous Oral History as Proof of Tribal Land Claims, 37 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 19, 32 (2012-2013).
10
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’
Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
263, 265 (2010) (explaining the unique ways in which indigenous people live off
and craft identities through a constant relation to the land they occupy).
11
See generally Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29,
2006) (hereinafter Sawhoyamaxa).
12
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, art.
15, ¶ 1(a), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Charter art. 73, ¶ 1(a); United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
13
See generally Seth Korman, Indigenous Ancestral Lands and Customary
International Law, 32 HAWAI’I L. REV. 391 (2010) (describing how recent
approaches to indigenous rights around the world may start to inform customary
international law as more and more nations’ behaviors strengthen the case for a
developing opinio juris on the scope of indigenous rights); Paul Kuruk, The Role of
Customary Law Under Sui Generis Frameworks of Intellectual Property Rights in
Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 67 (2007)
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that the country selectively follows. When American law disregards
indigenous oral histories, it selectively delegitimizes indigenous
communities’ lived experiences and potentially violates international
norms.14 Many aspects of indigenous rights, most prominently the issue of
recognizing the authority of non-written documentation, do not lend
themselves to easy assimilation into the American legal system.15 As a result,
cases involving Native American parties tend to be fraught with
preconceptions about the nature of authoritative documentation that frustrate
the very purpose of a judicial system meant to render fair and impartial
treatment before the law.16
Some societies place such a great degree of importance on passeddown spoken word to the point that they consider such spoken word
authoritative in the same manner by which other societies place a great degree
of importance on written documentation. These oral-knowledge societies
exercise an entire range of practices and institutions that give formality and
legitimacy to their non-written evidence, similar to how societies that place
more importance on written documents have developed practices and
institutions that reinforce the idea that written documentation is more reliable
than spoken word.17 Nothing inherent in written documentation makes it more
reliable than spoken word. While spoken word can be ill-remembered, altered
in content over time, or recounted differently, written documents can be
forged or amended or re-written after being signed onto. Despite this potential
for both mediums of knowledge to be faulty, U.S. courts usually presume that
written documents are valid unless a party presents evidence suggesting they
(explaining how indigenous customary legal systems and communities’ traditional
knowledge may ultimately affect international intellectual property laws and
norms).
14
"[The Inter-American Human Rights Commission (HRC)] has shown that past
wrongs could constitute a continuous violation of the contemporary rights enjoyed
by indigenous peoples under the [International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)]." Jeremie Gilbert, Historical Indigenous Peoples' Land Claims: A
Comparative and International Approach to the Common Law Doctrine of
Indigenous Title, 56 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 583, 595 (2007).
15
Consider communal rights that make up large parts of many Native American
nations’ customary law. They are often seen as incompatible with the way only
individual rights are codified in American law. "To grant sub-groups a special status
or alternative basis for defining themselves calls into question the 'substantiality of
the ethical order' that defines 'rights' in terms of individuals." Gerald Torres &
Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee
Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 657 (1990).
16
For example, in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.
1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979), the court favored written over oral
evidence. In fact, the bias towards written evidence was so strong that even the
expert witness for the Mashpee Tribe had telling language creep into his testimony
when he stated that he looked at every piece of paper surviving from that period.
Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, supra note 15, at 649, n.78.
17
See Peter M. Whiteley, Archaeology and Oral Tradition: The Scientific
Importance of Dialogue, 67
AM. ANTIQUITY 405 (2002).
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were forged or amended or their accuracy is doubtful. This is understandable;
American society employs practices and institutions that protect the reliability
of written documents, so courts are not initially skeptical of a written
document’s accuracy.
Spoken word, when preserved by practices and institutions, can lend
credence to its accuracy. These practices may take form as the memorization
of important stories by specific community members or elders, including
when a community engages in consistent retellings of a story at certain
important times of the year to mark its relevance. The documentation of
knowledge passed down by spoken word tends to be institutionalized through
the formal transmission of stories from one person of authority to another who
is recognized as an heir or apprentice. The community may selectively pass
oral histories down or have a secretive or sacred transmission process so that
a few privileged community members safeguard the accurate story from
alteration.18 Some communities hold festivals or celebrations where a story’s
retelling is traditionally held for all the community to hear and anyone can
voice a correction or disagreement with the retelling; this allows the
community as a whole to police the story’s authenticity.19 Yet these forms of
authority and practice are alien to U.S. courts and therefore judges tend to
consider oral histories unreliable.20 Reasonable arguments can discredit both
written and unwritten forms of evidence by virtue of their respective
mediums. In order to better-reflect the realities of handling Native American
land claims, U.S. judges will have to challenge longstanding assumptions
about unwritten information presented in the courtroom.
Canada has liberalized its evidentiary standards in the context of First
Nation litigation by allowing judges to accept more unwritten documentation
as probative or relevant to a case.21 This is particularly relevant to the United
States since Canada has experienced a similar colonial history and has sought
to solve the same problems with evidence standards that American courts

18

Secret or sacred histories which a community may believe holds power in its
words themselves are especially tricky in the context of evidentiary treatment.
“Aboriginal peoples have at times been forced into a position whereby they must
reveal sacred knowledge in order to show long- standing affiliation with land or
objects. Such knowledge is typically held very secretly, passed down orally by
women to women and men to men…[After] oral knowledge is given as evidence, it
becomes written text, available to be read by Native peoples and non- Native
peoples alike,” which may clash with the values a party or witness may hold.
Nicholas Buchanan & Eve Darian-Smith, Introduction: Law and the Problematics
of Indigenous Authenticities, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 115, 121 (2011).
19
GISDAY WA & DELGAM UUKW, THE SPIRIT IN THE LAND: THE OPENING
STATEMENT OF THE GITKSAN AND WET’SUWET’EN HEREDITARY CHIEFS IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA MAY 11, 1987, 26 (1989).
20
Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in
Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1301 (1996).
21
Babcock, supra note 9, at 61.
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face. The First Nations22 enjoy a unique legal status that is semi-autonomous
in a way similar to the unique sovereignty Native American nations in the
United States enjoy. Given these parallels between the two countries, Canada
is a useful case study for examining the benefits of relaxed hearsay standards.
The Inter-American Court acknowledges that decisions involving
indigenous communities require the active participation of those communities
that will be impacted by the court’s decision.23 In practice, the Court has
implemented this recognition by respecting indigenous repositories of
knowledge. This includes admitting oral testimony from indigenous
community members and from expert witnesses who collect this oral
testimony. The result is a more accurate and informed verdict.24 Norway also
recognizes the customary law of its indigenous people, the Sámi (who orally
transmit norms and practices), in its judicial process.25 Although Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Russia do not officially recognize Sámi customary law
as binding or co-equal with national law (and likely never will because of
extraneous considerations),26 Norwegian judges have recently begun
reviewing the authoritative Sámi cultural corpus so that the Sámi perspective
on an issue informs decisions centered around Sápmi (the Sámi homeland)
land, water, and resource use.27 Such judges keep Sámi cultural sensitivities
in mind when ruling on a case. This trend is a promising one given the wide
scope American judges enjoy in consulting persuasive, if not binding, legal
sources to inform their common law decisions. Norway’s approach could
propagate indigenous-sensitive standards of evidence in cases involving
Native American parties. The judicial systems in Canada, Norway, and the
Inter-American Court handle oral evidence in different ways; however, each
of these ways serves the same function: expanding court access to indigenous
communities in an effort to better address their grievances. Few obstacles
prevent American courts from adopting similar approaches for the same
result. Before analyzing how these three legal systems handle oral evidence,
it is necessary to explain how the American judicial system can accommodate
oral histories given the current rules of evidence.

22

First Nations are indigenous societies that survived British and French
colonization in Canada. They are considered legally distinct from Iñupiat
communities and Métis, people of mixed indigenous and European ancestry who are
not affiliated with any First Nation and yet have uniquely distinct indigenousinfluenced cultural practices.
23
Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the InterAmerican Human Rights System, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 281, 281-322 (2006).
24
Id.
25
See generally Dawid Bunikowski, Indigenous Peoples, Their Rights and
Customary Laws in the North: The Case of the Sámi People, 43 NORDICA
GEOGRAPHICAL PUBLICATIONS 75 (2013).
26
After all, allowing a migratory population of Sámi to regularly cross
Scandinavian and Russian borders would clash with those nations’ standards for
border security, not to mention taxation of inhabitants and uniformity of national
policies.
27
See Selbu, infra note 191.
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II. Oral Histories as Evidence in the United States
Limited exceptions exist for the inclusion of oral and other forms of
non-written evidence in certain situations. Consider the states that adopted the
rules of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) on parol evidence of a course
of performance, or course of dealing, when elucidating the meaning of a
business contract. U.C.C. § 1-303(f) states that “a course of performance is
relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with the
course of performance” of a contract. Oregon lifts this language entirely for
its statute on terms of trade:
“A course of performance or course of dealing between the
parties or usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which
the parties are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties’
agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms
of the agreement and may supplement or qualify the terms
of the agreement.”28
Illinois likewise inserted this language into its commercial code.29
In Oregon and Illinois state courts (and other U.C.C.-adopting states),
the written contract between two parties does not always settle disputes about
contract performance or what express terms in a contract apply. Instead, if a
judge finds it reasonable in the context of a case, she or he will analyze the
behavior and oral communication of the contract parties in order to elucidate
the meaning of a contract; in situations where the parties’ behavior does not
match the contract and the business deal concluded despite that, even
provisions of a contract that appear essential on paper could be thrown out or
omitted. Under the U.C.C., the behavior of contract signatories can override
what is presumably agreed upon in writing. According to the Illinois
Appellate Court, “the course of performance is more than an interpretive tool”
for determining the meaning of a contract since it also gives “rise to waiver
of express contractual terms if those terms are not strictly adhered to.”30 In
U.C.C.-influenced jurisdictions, performance is powerful enough to affect
how courts interpret a binding contract. This results in legal decisions where
non-written documentation not only informs but also takes precedence over
written word.
U.C.C. § 2-202 provides another example of a situation where nonwritten evidence can affect a binding contract. In U.C.C.-adopting
jurisdictions, even a mutually agreed-upon contract intended by both parties
to be the final expression of their agreement can be “explained or
supplemented” by a “course of dealing or usage of trade,” a “course of
28

OR. REV. STAT. § 71.3030(4) (2017).
810 ILL COMP STAT. § 5/1-303(d) (2017).
30
Midwest Builder Distrib., Inc. v. Lord & Essex, Inc., 383 Ill. App. 3d 645, 673
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (finding that when a homebuilder and subcontractor exchange a
credit information sheet and their behavior complies with that sheet, it becomes part
of the contractual agreement between the two parties arising from the behavior of
the parties alone).
29
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performance,” or “evidence of consistent additional terms” not present in the
finalized contract.31 The Supreme Court applied this principle to settle the
dispute between New York and New Jersey over which state held title to Ellis
Island, the home of the Statue of Liberty. The Court looked to the behavior of
both states in order to elucidate the meaning of the “poorly drafted and
ambiguous” Compact of 1834, a contract that both states relied upon to
regulate ownership of the island.32
Departing from the U.C.C., unwritten documentation also holds
power in some areas of contract law, such as with issues involving promissory
estoppel. When a party undergoes performance relying upon the promise or
word of another, and the performer is negatively affected by the promisemaker going against their word, some jurisdictions such as Nebraska may
interpret the oral agreement as part of a binding contract with legal
repercussions.33 Especially in the field of land rights and property law, many
disputes may be quelled if non-written evidence can be introduced for a factfinder to better-understand the context of a treaty, title, or contract.
A. Native Americans and the Hearsay Problem
Despite these examples, it remains doubtful that most state and
federal courts would admit Native American oral history, traditional
storytelling, or the recounting of past events as a matter of principle. Judges
wield broad discretion over the admittance of evidence and, too often, they
use that discretion to the detriment of Native American parties in court.34
Consider Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, where the court remarked
that the oral histories the Coos Bay Nation presented as evidence would be in
theory sufficient to prove “by hearsay” that it occupied a territory and yet held
that the evidence was still insufficient to meet the required burden of proof
since it was, ultimately, hearsay.35 Court refusal to admit Native American
oral history is far from a relic of colonialism; it continues to affect courts
today. In Chippewa Community v. Exxon Corp., similarly, the Sokaogon
Nation unsuccessfully used oral history to justify its right to occupy its land
based on the federal government’s promise of a reservation.36 The Seventh
Circuit characterized the oral history evidence as “at best embroidered [and]
at worst fictitious.”37 The Sokaogon failed to “cast [the oral history evidence]
into a form in which it would be admissible in a court of law," and as a result,
failed to state a valid claim.38 This is a major problem because many land
31

U.C.C. § 2-202(a-b).
New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 830 (1998).
33
See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 54 (1898) (finding that a granddaughter is
entitled to her deceased grandfather’s money after she quit her job because her
grandfather promised her that if she did so, he would gift her a pension when he
passed away since he wanted “none of [his] grandchildren [to] work.”)
34
Babcock, supra note 9, at 38.
35
87 Ct. Cl. 143, 150-153 (1938).
36
2 F.3d 219 (7th Cir. 1993).
37
Id. at 222.
38
Id. at 224-5.
32
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disputes originate from oral agreements, or settlers wrote their interpretation
down in a manner that conflicted with the version Native Americans passed
down orally,39 or codified in other non-written archival modes.40
The judicial practice of refusing to admit Native American oral
histories may also blind courts to the cultural significance Native Americans
attach to a given site or artifact. According to the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), scientists conducting tests on
“certain human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of
cultural patrimony with which [certain Native American tribes] are
affiliated” must obtain a license from the Native American nations involved.41
This requirement was the heart of the issue in Bonnichsen v. United States.42
The Ninth Circuit criticized the U.S. Secretary of Interior’s reliance on oral
history evidence as it found the stories too tenuous to suggest “authenticity,
reliability, and accuracy.”43 The Interior Secretary used oral histories
provided by the Nez Perce, Umatilla Reservation, Yakama, and Colville
Reservation nations in order to establish the cultural affiliation NAGPRA
requires between the tribes from the Columbia Plateau region and a
prehistoric skeleton named the Kennewick Man by anthropologists.44 The
goal of the Interior Secretary was to show how important and significant the
human remains were to the local Native American nations so that those
remains could be repatriated in a dignified manner instead of kept for
anthropological testing. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Interior Secretary
literally, believing the oral histories were meant to establish a strong scientific
relation (rather than a cultural relation, the only criteria required to invoke
NAGPRA protections) between the remains of a prehistoric Native American
and contemporary tribes; the judge revealed his literal interpretation with the
39

"However, where written records do exist, they often do not contain adequate
information on Aboriginal use and occupation of land and tend to be tainted by the
European perspective of the persons who produced them." Lori Ann Roness & Kent
McNeil, Legalizing Oral History: Proving Aboriginal Claims in Canadian Courts,
39 J. West 66, 67-68 (2000).
40
For just one of numerous examples of indigenous non-written archival
production, consider diplomacy via wampum exchange. See generally Wilbur R.
Jacobs, Wampum: The Protocol of Indian Diplomacy, 6 Wm. & Mary Q. 596
(1949); READING THE WAMPUM: ESSAYS ON HODINÖHSÖ:NI’ VISUAL CODE AND
EPISTEMOLOGICAL RECOVERY (Penelope Myrtle Kelsey ed., 2014); George S.
Snyderman, The Functions of Wampum, 98 PROC AM PHILOS SOC 469 (Dec. 1954).
Note that as both native and settler societies spread the concept of wampum further
west to the Great Plains and Rocky Mountain regions, the functions and uses of
wampum changed drastically from those employed by the eastern cultures where
wampum originated. Jordan Keagle, Eastern Beads, Western Applications:
Wampum Among Plains Tribes, 33 GREAT PLAINS Q. 221, 221 (Fall 2013).
41
25 U.S.C. § 3002(c)(1).
42
367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
43
Id. at 882.
44
Id. at 881. The Kennewick Man is human remains found in Kennewick,
Washington along the banks of the Columbia River in 1996. Anthropologists have
been studying these remains hoping to elucidate the genetic origins of early
Americans.
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words “8340 to 9200 years between the life of Kennewick Man and the
present is too long a time to bridge merely with evidence of oral traditions.”45
From a scientific perspective, it is questionable to connect
contemporary tribes to prehistoric remains, yet this approach unjustifiably
excludes consideration of the cultural significance of the remains.
Scientifically and historically, there is no verifiable connection between Jesus
Christ’s alleged burial place or crucifixion spot in Jerusalem and the Christian
deity’s actual burial and crucifixion location, given that the site of the Church
of the Holy Sepulchre was identified and built upon over three centuries after
Jesus’s death.46 Yet this does not diminish the cultural and spiritual
significance of the site to the world’s Christian population.47 The
archaeological excavation done within the church at Jesus’s burial site could
only have occurred with the permission of the Christian orders that held
custodial duties over the sacred site.48 In a similar manner, by establishing a
cultural connection to the Kennewick Man through oral histories, the Interior
Secretary aimed to repatriate the remains into the tribes’ custody as the
remains held significant value for a people who spiritually venerate ancestors,
triggering NAGPRA protections.49 If scientists wished to conduct tests on the
45

Id. at 882.
See generally Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf202.toc.html (ebook) (“It is not probable that
any person whose opinion is worth expressing would now positively assert that the
buildings which are known all the world over as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre
do actually cover the spot where Jesus of Nazareth was buried…it is at least
extremely improbable that their site has any claims to authenticity, having been
selected by mere chance by persons who knew, at all events, no more about the
matter than we do.”); See also J. R. Macpherson, The Church of the Resurrection,
or of the Holy Sepulchre, 7 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REV. 417 (1892).
47
Macpherson, supra note 46, at 417 (“But if on the ground of historical accuracy
these buildings must cease to draw towards them the religious devotion of
Christendom, they become scarcely less interesting to the historian and the
archaeologist. Their rise and their fall have been for fifteen centuries epoch-marking
events in history: they bring us face to face with the first Christian emperor of the
Romans [up to] the quarrels of east and west for nearly a thousand years.”).
48
Kristin Romey, Exclusive: Christ’s Burial Place Exposed for First Time in
Centuries, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/10/jesus-tomb-opened-church-holysepulchre/ (“The Church of the Holy Sepulchre (also known as the Church of the
Resurrection) is currently under the custody of six Christian sects. Three major
groups—the Greek Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the
Armenian Orthodox Church—maintain primary control over the site, and the
Coptic, Ethiopian Orthodox, and Syriac communities also have a presence there.
Parts of the church that are considered common areas of worship for all of the sects,
including the tomb, are regulated by a Status Quo agreement that requires the
consent of all of the custodial churches.”).
49
The Native American defendants made it clear to the court that they believed
“when a body goes into the ground, it is meant to stay there until the end of time.
When remains are disturbed and remain above the ground, their spirits are at
unrest….To put these spirits at ease, the remains must be returned to the ground as
46
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Kennewick Man, they ought to have followed the NAGPRA guidelines and
requested a license from the Native American nations to whom these ancestral
remains are considered sacred and worthy of proper ceremonial treatment as
per their customs.50 The Ninth Circuit misunderstood the relevance of
introducing the oral history as evidence which prevented it from accurately
interpreting the NAGPRA statute.
Outside of the courtroom, oral history is sometimes more reliable
than written documentation. This arises occasionally in disciplines such as
history, anthropology,51 and archaeology.52 For example, physical
anthropologists who did tests on remains found in a mass grave uncovered
information that contradicted the written accounts of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints about the Mountain Meadows Massacre and more
closely aligned with oral histories passed down by Native Americans in the
region.53 If it is possible for oral histories to be more factual than written
documents in some circumstances outside of the courtroom, it would be
alarming if courts did not consider this possibility arising in the context of a
legal dispute when presented with information that suggests such. With the
help of corroborating evidence, a judge could allow oral history into a
courtroom given a preponderance of evidence sufficient to support a finding
that it is reliable54 and probative.55 Sometimes, the consequence may be that
the oral history invalidates a contract, treaty, or other legal instrument. As
long as this remains a possibility, it would be imprudent for a judge to reject
all oral testimony.
Some cases show workarounds to the hearsay problem through
creative use of existing evidence rules. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow
witnesses to be qualified as experts if they have specialized knowledge or
experience about a probative topic.56 The judge is a metaphorical gatekeeper
for expert information and uses the Daubert factors to determine the validity

soon as possible.” Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 870 n.8 (9th Cir.
2004). Yet the Ninth Circuit’s approach to Native American oral testimony stopped
it from seriously analyzing all the evidence that would have resulted in a deeper
appreciation for the magnitude of the defendants’ religious beliefs regarding the
Kennewick Man’s remains.
50
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-5.
51
Kerry D. Feldman, Ethnohistory and the Anthropologist as Expert Witness in
Legal Disputes: A Southwestern Alaska Case, 36 J. OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES.
245, 246 (1980).
52
Peter M. Whiteley, Archaeology and Oral Tradition: The Scientific Importance of
Dialogue, 67 AM. ANTIQUITY 405, 408 (2002) (critiquing experts who believe
written records compiled during the Spanish colonial era are accurate accounts of
historical events).
53
Taylor S. Fielding, Evidence Issues in Indian Law Cases, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 285,
297 (2017).
54
Fed. R. Evid. 104.
55
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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of an expert witness’s testimony.57 These factors are neither dispositive nor
exhaustive; they provide ample discretion for a judge to admit oral history
into evidence.58 Since the majority of the 574 federally recognized Native
American nations have their own cultural norms about who maintains or
archives oral traditions and history, these orators may well be experts in the
legal sense in that they have access to a specialized knowledge that is not
readily available to other tribal members.59 A Native American elder
recounting oral history often relies on cultural canons of appraisal, which,
within that elder’s community, distinguish between the non-expert account of
a layperson and a qualified recounting.60 In the past, the Ninth Circuit has
approved of expert testimony that was based on hearsay in certain
circumstances.61 In particular, the Circuit deferred to an expert’s own
standards of reliability, as Rule 703 authorizes: “[I]f experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an
opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be
admitted.”62 Judges could apply the same evaluation to oral history evidence
in cases involving Native American parties.
Occasionally, cases arise in which oral histories of indigenous people
may play a pivotal role. The Ninth Circuit admitted oral history in Cree v.
Sandberg, for example, which involved a treaty dispute (although not to
elucidate the contents of the treaty).63 Rather, the trial judge allowed the oral
testimony in order to establish how tribal members interpreted the treaty
language. This was a use of probative evidence that fell well within his
discretion.64 The Federal Court of Claims, too, at times attributes weight to
57

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). The five
Daubert factors are (1) whether the theory or technique in question can be and has
been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) its
known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance
within a relevant scientific community.
58
Id. at 592.
59
Bruce G. Miller, Culture as Cultural Defense: An American Indian Sacred Site in
Court, 22 AM. INDIAN Q. 82, 90 (1998).
60
Peter M. Whiteley, Archaeology and Oral Tradition: The Scientific Importance of
Dialogue, 67 AM. ANTIQUITY 405, 407 (2002). If it strikes the reader as difficult or
impossible to challenge the reliability of oral histories if they are assumed to be
accurate, consider the following possible ways: the opposing party could discredit
the elder’s standing (by providing witnesses from the elder’s community who
dispute his or her leadership), engage in a battle of the experts with testimony from
other elders, introduce social scientists who can draw attention to flaws in the oral
history’s narrative, etc. A judge can use his or her discretion and may give little
weight to admitted oral history if the opposing party brings forth witnesses
contesting the elder’s recognized leadership, whether the elder’s recounting is
inaccurate based upon another elder’s recounting of the same story, or whether the
oral history is contradicted by other admitted evidence.
61
United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Fed. R. Evid. 703.
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Cree v. Sandberg, 157 F.3d 762, 773-744 (9th Cir. 1998).
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oral histories based on the precedent established in Pueblo De Zia v. United
States.65 The Indian Claims Commission had ignored oral histories recounted
by witnesses because, in its view, they, “in point of time, are far removed
from the issue in question.”66 On appeal, the Court of Claims reversed,
holding that oral history is “entitled to some weight” and should not be
categorically “discarded as ‘literally worthless’” when used in conjunction
with corroborating historical and archaeological evidence.67 The Pueblo De
Zia community thereby met the burden of proof for establishing its aboriginal
title to the land.68
Courts have seldom used FRE 803(20), the hearsay exception for
Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History,69 yet it holds the
potential to use oral evidence in bolstering land claims. The U.S. Court of
Claims has adopted the language of FRE 803(20) on its face, implicitly if not
explicitly. In Wally v. United States, the court never directly mentioned the
rule, yet the court admitted the testimony of a number of witnesses as parol
evidence to prove the location of different tracts of land.70 The court admitted
that the testimony was hearsay. The witnesses had no personal knowledge of
the land’s location. Still, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the witness
testimony was acceptable as an exception to the hearsay rule. The court stated
“community reputation about facts which are no longer available to
individuals or susceptible of other proof has long been admissible to show the
location of ancient boundaries.” 71 The court rationalized this exception by
stating that a community’s general acceptance of a fact is unlikely to be false
given how “prolonged and constant exposure of these facts” among a
community “sifts out” inaccuracies and errors by popular belief and allows
the facts to be presented as reliable evidence in court.72
If one court reaches this conclusion about a rural community’s
collective memory, but another rejects the same sort of evidence from a rural
Native American community, the issue lies in the evidentiary discretion
afforded judges. In New Mexico ex rel. State Engineer v. Aragon, Judge
Khalsa demonstrated the flexibility inherent in judicial discretion when
dismissing New Mexico’s motion in limine seeking to exclude a family’s oral
history from consideration at trial.73 The state argued that a family’s insistence
on the existence of irrigation ditches when their property was first settled
under the Homestead Act constituted impermissible hearsay. Yet the court
ruled that the family should have “the opportunity to lay foundation regarding
the admissibility of the reputation evidence at trial, and the State an
opportunity to challenge the foundation” before the court decided whether the
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Pueblo De Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 505 (1964).
Id. at 504 (citing 11 Ind. Cl. Comm., 131, 168 (1962)).
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Id. (emphasis in original).
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Wally v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 371, 373 (1960).
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New Mexico ex rel. State Eng’r v. Aragon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5310 (2017).
66

2021

NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL EVIDENCE

33

testimony was admissible as evidence.74 The court recognized that there was
a formal process by which to evaluate the family’s statements and refused to
bar the hearsay’s admittance outright.
Some evidence scholars have long criticized the hearsay rule’s
inadequacy and argued it is in desperate need of reform.75 Indeed, updating
the Federal Rules of Evidence could ameliorate the issues this note covers.76
Yet an overhaul of the Federal Rules of Evidence is unlikely given the inertia
of the status quo.77 Nonetheless, adoption of a new perspective on the existing
rules of evidence to recognize the validity of Native American oral testimony
under some circumstances would ameliorate a significant injustice in cases
involving greater burdens of proof on indigenous parties who rely on
traditional knowledge to make a claim.
Rules of evidence from other legal systems can be readily
incorporated into the FRE by reinterpreting existing rules or by modest
amendments. For many land claim cases, FRE 803(20)’s hearsay exception is
directly relevant and would allow oral history to be used as permitted hearsay
evidence: “A reputation in a community—arising before the controversy—
concerning boundaries of land in the community or customs that affect the
land, or concerning general historical events important to that community,
state, or nation.”78 Judges may find this reading valid in an appropriate context
rather than dismissing indigenous oral histories as unauthoritative or
unreliable.
In Pueblo of Jemez v. U.S., the New Mexico District Court described
the conditions necessary for it to accept indigenous oral histories as evidence
pursuant to the FRE.79 According to the Court, finding a FRE 807 residual
hearsay exception, or exercising judicial discretion, is “reserved for
exceptional cases.”80 For the court in Jemez, oral histories did not fall into that
category since exceptional cases “occur when hearsay evidence is relevant
74

Id. at 12-13.
David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
76
For example, adopting a “best evidence hearsay rule” where a court determines
that hearsay is better evidence than that which is readily available, would
encompass most of the existing exceptions to the hearsay doctrine and allow a
degree of flexibility that would maximize the amount of evidence under
consideration by the fact-finder within the spirit of the existing hearsay exceptions.
Michael L. Siegel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay
Rule, 72 B.U.L. Rev. 893, 934 (1992). For reasons I will go into later in the note, a
court could conceivably consider Native American oral testimony better evidence
than what is available, for example when compared to forged or inaccurately
recorded land deeds, or even in the face of no written or conflicting evidence at all.
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As Justice Jackson famously wrote when he remarked upon whether the Federal
Rules of Evidence required amendment, “[t]o pull one misshapen stone out of the
grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance between
adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.” Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
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and reliable, and no other evidence, or little other evidence, is available on the
same point.”81 The court was skeptical that oral histories counted as
exceptional in all situations:
The Court need not and should not shoehorn to get the
oral history evidence in. It is not worth much. It is often
legend or myth that defies scientific proof, or it is selfserving testimony that does little more than state Jemez
Pueblo’s position. The Court knows Jemez Pueblo’s
position. The Court does not need
rule 807 to get that position into the case.82
With those words, the court rejected both the relevance and reliability
of oral histories as a broad class of evidence. Yet the Jemez court did admit
oral histories into evidence on two occasions. The court found that “the most
relevant oral tradition evidence” submitted, testimony about land use
boundaries, satisfied FRE 803(20) as community reputation evidence and so
any of the numerous 803 exceptions were valid.83 The court also admitted oral
history evidence that was satisfactorily corroborated by expert opinion
pursuant to FRE 702. Although the Jemez Court barred oral evidence from
FRE 807 consideration, it did prove that U.S. courts can admit oral history
testimony in many circumstances.84 Detailed in the following section,
Canadian judges go further in their level of discretion almost to the point of
elevating indigenous oral histories into a permanent FRE 807 exception.
III. Adapting Oral Evidence Standards to Native American Practice:
Canada
Canada, in what appears to be a good faith attempt to grapple with its
colonial and imperialist history, has created avenues for exempting hearsay
evidence that allow indigenous groups to introduce evidence that ordinarily
would be barred by British common-law hearsay prohibitions.85 Canada
amended its Constitution in a way that gave courts discretion to liberalize oral
evidence rules with the purpose of aiding First Nation land rights claims.86
The historical and legal context that led to this amendment is critical to
understanding its rationale, as is understanding the relationship between the
Canadian government and Canada’s First Nations.
81

Id. at 53.
Id.
83
Id.
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Indeed, the ability of the Jemez court to admit oral histories under two classes of
hearsay exceptions encouraged the court to find that there was no need for a FRE
807 treatment since “on balance, such need is insufficient to compel admission” of
oral history as an exceptional case.
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A. A New Standard is Born
Canada’s progressive policy toward First Nation land claims began
with Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia in 1973.87 Frank Calder,
an elder of the Nisga’a First Nation, claimed that no treaty ever extinguished
their land title.88 British Columbia’s Supreme Court and the Provincial Court
of Appeal both rejected the claim, ruling that “after conquest or discovery, the
native people have no rights at all except those subsequently granted or
recognized by the conqueror or discoverer.”89 The Supreme Court overturned
the lower decision and ruled that the Nisga’a Nation did have aboriginal
title.90 Unlike the norm in the American legal system, the Supreme Court of
Canada said:
When the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in
societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done
for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not
help one in the solution of this problem to call it a ‘personal
87

Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
Id. at 313. The Nisga’a chiefs had a long and defiant struggle in challenging
Canadian sovereignty, especially given that the government colonized British
Columbia via land grants to settlers instead of enacting any formal agreements with
them. In 1888 when the government of British Columbia attempted to set up First
Nation reservations, they responded, “what we don’t like about the Government is
their saying this: ‘We will give you this much land.’ How can they give it when it is
our own? We cannot understand it. They have never bought it from us or our
forefathers. They have never fought and conquered our people and taken the land in
that way, and yet they say now that they will give us so much land—our land. These
chiefs do not talk foolishly, they know the land is their own; our forefathers for
generations and generations past had their land here all around us; chiefs have had
their own hunting grounds, their salmon streams, and places where they got their
berries; it has always been so. It is not only during the last four or five years that we
have seen the land; we have always seen and owned it; it is no new things, it has
been ours for generations. If we had only seen it for twenty years and claimed it as
our own, it would have been foolish, but it has been ours for thousands of years. If
any strange person came here and saw the land for twenty years and claimed it. He
would be foolish. We have always got our living from the land; we are not like
white people who live in towns and have their stores and other business, getting
their living in that way, but we have always depended on the land for our food and
clothes; we get our salmon, berries, and furs from the land.” Id. at 319.
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Id. at 315.
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Id. at 313. Interestingly, the Canadian Supreme Court describes how the Canadian
judiciary’s approach to aboriginal title was influenced by two decisions from the
United States’ own Chief Justice Marshall: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587,
588 (1823) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). In McIntosh, Marshall
states “the power now possessed by the government of the United States to grant
lands, resided, while we were colonies, in the crown, or its grantees…All our
institutions recognize the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right
of occupancy; and recognized the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right.
This is incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the Indians.” The
Canadian courts have since held that the First Nations could only transfer title of
their occupied lands to the Crown. See also St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co.
v. R., (1887) 13 S.C.R. 577 (Can.).
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or usufructuary right’. What they are asserting in this action
is that they had a right to continue to live on their lands as
their forefathers had lived.91
With this language, the Canadian Supreme Court essentially rejected the
transmission of land rights by conquest over previous inhabitants and
described a right to intergenerational cultural transmission embedded by
reliance on, or strong connection to, the land itself. It was also the first time
the Canadian legal system acknowledged aboriginal title not derived from
colonial law. Unfortunately for the Nisga’a Nation, the court reasoned that
the Crown properly extinguished the aboriginal title the Nation held with its
establishment of the Colony of British Columbia over their lands.92 Yet
Calder opened the door to subsequent litigation by First Nations eager to
assert claims of aboriginal title.
Subsequently, in R. v. Van der Peet, the Supreme Court of Canada
established a new approach to evaluating evidence in aboriginal cases.93 Chief
Justice Lamer adopted a standard for “whether an aboriginal claimant has
produced evidence sufficient to demonstrate that her activity is an aspect of a
practice, custom, or tradition integral to a distinctive aboriginal culture.”94 For
91

Calder, [1973] S.C.R. at 328.
Id. at 338. The Canadian Supreme Court looked to American jurisprudence to
decide the issue of whether, given that the Nisga’a Nation no longer held aboriginal
title to their lands, if it was proper for the Canadian government to compensate them
for their loss. See generally United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40
(1946). The Tillamooks tribe sought compensation for Congress’s reduction of their
reservation lands, which was done illegally since the Tillamooks’ treaty allowing a
cession of their land in exchange for a reservation, was never ratified by the Senate.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Tillamooks were entitled to compensation without
the need to prove that their aboriginal title was recognized by the United States.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States later clarified that this earlier compensation
arose out of a statute granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction over legal and
equitable claims arising out of aboriginal title disputes. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). As
such, the Tee-Hit-Ton (a subgroup of the Tlingit tribe) lost their argument that the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause applied to Congressional takings of aboriginal
titled-land. “This is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which
the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties but which right of
occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign
itself without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.” Id. at
279. The Supreme Court, apparently deciding that recognition of aboriginal title
was as far as it was willing to go in supplying justice to the colonized people of
Canada, ruled that the Crown was not required to compensate the Nisga’a Nation
for seizing their land without treaty or conquest. Calder at 346. A powerful dissent
argued the exact opposite of the majority: that the Nisga’a Nation still held
aboriginal title as it was never extinguished, and they were entitled to compensation.
Id. at 422 (Hall, Spence, and Laskin, JJ., dissenting). The majority opinion was at
least somewhat more favorable to the First Nations than the dissent that claimed
Canada enjoyed sovereign immunity from its subjugated nations. Id. at 427 (Pigeon,
J., dissenting).
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a court to properly follow this standard, it must “interpret the evidence that
exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims, and of
the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where
there were no written records.”95 This follows naturally from Calder’s
establishment of aboriginal title, for if the title predates colonial contact and
government, then title would naturally be unwritten, requiring proof by
alternative means. Chief Justice Lamer further ruled that Canadian courts
should not “undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply
because that evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary
standards that would be applied in, for example, a private law torts case.”96
And so the Canadian judicial system recognized that First Nation oral
histories deserved treatment that brought them closer to the probative value
afforded to settler society’s written documents.
Lest ambiguity persist, one year later, the Supreme Court clarified in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia that all Canadian courts must “take into
account the perspective of the aboriginal people” when they are parties to a
case involving their land and cultural rights, as well as “the perspective of the
common law,” putting both “on an equal footing.”97 Chief Justice Lamer
wrote that “aboriginal rights are truly sui generis” and cases involving them
“demand a unique approach to the treatment of evidence which accords due
weight to the perspective of aboriginal peoples.”98 Oral histories recounted by
the First Nations received their proper sanctioning with these words since they
fulfill the role of historical documents as their communities’ formal accounts
of the past.99
The Canadian Supreme Court ruled this way mainly because of the
difficulties associated with proving pre-colonial legal rights and the
“impossible burden of proof on those claiming this protection.”100 The Court
further elaborated on this rationale in Mitchell v. M.N.R., where Chief Justice
McLachlin held that the “special nature of Aboriginal claims” mandated this
flexible approach to admissible evidence.101 But he also warned that the Court
95
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However, it is important to recognize that Delgamuukw did not wholly dismantle
the Canadian judiciary’s pre-existing anti-First Nation structural issues. The Court
quoted Van der Peet, writing “that accommodation must be done in a manner which
does not strain ‘the Canadian legal and constitutional structure.’” Delgamuukw, ¶
49. As one commentator writes, “Thus, even though the Court has made great
efforts to ensure that the ‘laws of evidence [are] adapted in order that [oral histories
and tradition] can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types
of historical evidence that courts are familiar with,’ the fact that they must be
reconciled with assertions of Crown sovereignty means that, in the end, this new
standard risks ‘perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at
the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre-existing
aboriginal societies.’” John Borrows, Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37.3 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 557 (1999).
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did not mean to dismiss traditional evidentiary standards by creating this new
application. Rather, “there is a boundary that must not be crossed between a
sensitive application” of the existing rules of evidence and “a complete
abandonment of” them.102 When First Nation testimony could not sufficiently
supply convincing evidence, even by these appropriately sensitive standards,
an “absence of even minimally cogent evidence” could not justify a finding
of Aboriginal rights.103 In short, the evidentiary standards should depend on
the context of each individual case rather than on any categorical guidelines.
Canadian judges thereafter had to undertake the formidable task of balancing
“sensitively applying evidentiary principles” with “straining these principles
beyond reason” in the course of evaluating whether to dismiss aboriginal
evidence as too attenuated under ordinary evidentiary rules—or allowing
them in circumstances where the old evidentiary rules would not.104 The
Supreme Court concluded that the overall consideration should be forever to
eschew evaluating “oral histories [in a way that would] count against both
their admissibility and their weight as evidence of prior events in a court that
took a traditional approach to the rules of evidence.”105
In Canadian courts, oral history may therefore be admitted if it is both
probative and reasonably reliable in the discretion of the trial judge.106 This is
similar to the discretion of American judges under FRE 403. In the context of
aboriginal rights, as framed by Canadian Supreme Court precedent, oral
histories have probative value if they offer evidence that would be unavailable
in textual sources or that seriously conflicts with textual sources.107
Reasonable reliability requirements are satisfied not through an analysis of
the content of the oral history presented but rather by the credibility of the
source, such as the status of the witness within an aboriginal community. This
adheres to the principle established in Mitchell, where Chief Justice
McLachlin cautioned against “assumptions based on Eurocentric traditions of
gathering and passing on historical facts.”108
B. Applying Van der Peet and Mitchell in the Lower Courts
Lower courts in the Canadian system have borne the brunt of these
reforms. They have had to change longstanding presumptions about the
unreliability of oral histories and to develop procedural respect for Native
American standards for establishing facts, lest they risk admonishments on
appeal. Half-hearted treatments of oral history evidence have been critiqued
by the Court in order to emphasize the paradigm shift that Mitchell wrought.
For example, in Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a
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new trial because the trial judge had not adequately applied the principles
established by its precedents to oral history.109
Over a period of 318 days of trial testimony,110 the Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en Nations submitted examples of totem poles with their Houses’
crests and distinctive regalia carved on them documenting their
genealogies.111 The Gitksan Houses also presented their “adaawk,” a
“collection of sacred oral tradition about their ancestors, histories, and
territories.”112 The We’suwet’en Houses individually presented their
“kungax” or “spiritual song[s] or dance[s] or performance[s] [tying] them to
their land.”113 Additionally, both the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en recounted
stories shared and passed down during spiritual occasions at their ceremonial
feast halls;114 these stories’ purposes were to “identify their territories and
remind themselves of the sacred connection that they have with their
lands.”115 During the recounting of these stories, any participant had the
“opportunity to object if they question[ed] any detail and, in this way, [to]
help ensure the authenticity of the adaawk and kungax.”116
The trial judge, although recognizing that the evidence constituted
hearsay, considered all of it admissible “on the basis of the recognized
exception that declarations made by deceased persons could be given in
evidence by witnesses as proof of public or general rights.”117 It was also
admitted out of necessity since the plaintiffs could not otherwise prove the
history of their respective nations.118 Yet, on the merits, the Supreme Court
held that the trial judge erroneously interpreted these items of evidence in a
way that conflicted with the Court’s stated goal of reconciliation with
aboriginal communities, a goal it clarified later in the decision.
Nonetheless, the trial judge claimed that since individual Houses
presented their adaak and kungax, these did not account for the “uniform
custom relating to land outside the villages” these specific oral histories
represented.119 The trial judge therefore concluded that “the spiritual beliefs
exercised within the territory were [not] necessarily common to all the
people” or “universal practices,” and so the “oral histories, totem poles, and
crests were not sufficiently reliable or site specific to discharge the plaintiff’s
burden of proof.”120 The trial judge also dismissed the ceremonial feast hall
testimony because although important decisions regarding the entire
109
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community originated there in the context of the generational transmission of
cultural knowledge, the judge “did not accept its role in the management and
allocation of lands,” remarking that he “[could not] infer from the evidence
that the Indians possessed or controlled any part of the territory, other than
[specific] village sites.”121 Since the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en failed to
establish ownership, jurisdiction over, or aboriginal rights to their wrongfully
appropriated lands, the trial judge dismissed their claims.122
The Court of Appeals affirmed and dismissed the First Nations’
allegation that the judge’s fact-finding constituted an abuse of discretion.123
The Supreme Court criticized the lower court’s judgements since “the trial
judge…went on to give these oral histories no independent weight at all.”124
Rather, he devalued the oral history presented because it could not be
characterized as “literally true,” “confounded ‘what is fact and what is
belief,’” “included…mythology,” and “projected a ‘romantic view’ of the
history.” While he framed his decisions based on the individual items of
evidence, he did so, in the Supreme Court’s opinion, only to mask broad and
sweeping misgivings about oral history in general, claiming that it “did not
accurately convey historical truth.”125 If the trial judge’s remarks went
unchecked, the Supreme Court continued, “the oral histories of aboriginal
peoples would be consistently and systematically undervalued by the
Canadian legal system, in contradiction of the express instruction to the
contrary in Van der Peet,” which demanded that trial courts consider the merit
and value of oral histories in light of the difficulties inherent for aboriginal
parties in litigation.126
Since he erred so egregiously in his fact-finding and analysis and
contravened the spirit of Van der Preet and Mitchell, the Supreme Court
ordered a new trial. Calder laid the groundwork for the importance of
subsequent oral history evidence. In particular, Van der Preet and Mitchell
outlined the rationale for finding oral histories probative. Delgamuukw
established that while oral histories may be valid evidence, Canadian judges
should not evaluate them in the same way as traditional written evidence;
rather, courts should give oral histories due respect and weigh them from an
indigenous perspective.
Canada’s acceptance of oral history as evidence is a robust grant of
access for indigenous people to a court system in a way that respects and
reaffirms their cultural practices and beliefs. It is not difficult to imagine the
United States adopting these evidentiary standards and following Canada’s
lead, especially given the similarities between the two nations’ historical
treatment of evidence and their shared Anglo-American jurisprudential
traditions. Although Canada’s reforms have been spearheaded by
constitutional reform that would be difficult in the United States, its
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arguments for an indigenous-based exception to the hearsay rule can be
applied with current U.S. procedural evidentiary jurisprudence.127 The
rationales adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
Norwegian courts achieved the same result by a different, but no less
persuasive, route.
IV. Direct Admission on Probative Value: Inter-American Court
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is no stranger to
indigenous land rights cases. Due to the frequency of indigenous rights claims
brought before it, the Court has developed a sophisticated method for
admitting oral evidence from indigenous parties. In each case where it admits
such evidence, the Court goes out of its way to recognize the role that oral
expressions and traditions play in bolstering the legal claims of indigenous
people.128 The Court’s rules of procedure reflect this philosophy; they are
sparse compared to the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence and leave much
discretion to the Court in terms of both how to admit evidence and what
evidence to admit. Article 44 of the Court’s procedural rules contain the
relevant provisions:
The Court may, at any stage of the proceedings:
1) Obtain, on its own motion, any evidence it
considers helpful. In particular, it may hear as a
witness, expert witness, or in any other capacity, any
person whose evidence, statement, or opinion it
deems to be relevant.
2) Request the parties to provide any evidence within
their reach or any explanation or statement that, in its
opinion, may be useful.
3) Request any entity, office, organ, or authority of
its choice to obtain information, express an opinion,
or deliver a report or pronouncement on any given
point…
4) Commission one or more of its members to
conduct measures in order to gather evidence.129
The Inter-American Court’s broad discretion therefore includes the
ability (i) to obtain “any evidence it considers helpful” including oral
evidence; (ii) to hear from “any person” whose opinions or statements it
deems “relevant”; (iii) to admit expert testimony from indigenous elders and
leaders versed in the oral histories of their communities; (iv) to request “any
127
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evidence” or “statement” that “may be useful” in which case a party may
consult oral histories or statements relating to them; and (v) to order member
states to gather this evidence insofar as it deems it necessary.130
The high volume of indigenous-issue cases before the Court coupled
with its liberal rules of procedure places the court in a prime position to set
an example for how to gather evidence in a way that treats indigenous oral
histories as authoritative and probative evidentiary sources. Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay and Mayagna Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua
demonstrate how the Inter-American Court has not wasted this potential. The
Court not only admitted indigenous plaintiffs’ oral histories as evidence but
also invalidated Paraguay and Nicaragua’s documentation and fact-finding
when the indigenous perspective conflicted with them. The Court referenced
its procedural rules for prioritizing relevancy whenever it sought to justify its
reliance on the indigenous people’s accounts of past events and
anthropological evidence of their lands’ history.
A. Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay
Paraguay’s Gran Chaco is a vast stretch of sparsely populated, semiarid land. Its name derives from the Quechua word chaccu, meaning ‘hunting
land’ and it comprises 60% of Paraguay’s landmass (but only 2% of its
population).131 The Paraguayan government, eager to economically exploit
this vast region, sponsored its development into ranchland.132 The
Sawhoyamaxa Community, a group of Enxet speakers indigenous to the
Chaco region, are one of many indigenous groups that have appealed to the
Paraguayan government to honor their ancestral land claims amidst
harassment and forced removal by the ranchers.133 The state deemed their
land to be private property held by business interests. To avoid convictions
of trespass or local vigilante justice, the Sawhoyamaxa Community fled their
lands to live at the ranches’ gates that prevented them from returning home;
they remained destitute by the roadside for eight years.134 Meanwhile, the
health and economic conditions of the Sawhoyamaxa Community
deteriorated to such a point that in 1999, President Luis Ángel González
Macchi declared a state of emergency drawing attention to the deprivation
of the community’s “access to the traditional means of subsistence tied to
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their cultural identity as a result of the prohibition by the owners to their
entry to the habitat they claimed as part of their ancestral territories.”135
In Paraguay, rural lands are governed by the administrative law
promulgated and applied by the Instituto de Bienestar Rural (IBR).136 The
Sawhoyamaxa Community leaders invoked Article 64 of the Paraguayan
Constitution while entreating the IBR, which states:
The indigenous peoples have [the] right to communal
ownership of the land, in [an] extension and quality sufficient
for the preservation and the development of their particular
forms of lifestyles. The State will provide them gratuitously
with these lands, which will be nonseizable, indivisible,
nontransferable…The removal of [indigenous peoples] from
their habitat without their express consent is prohibited.137
After fourteen years of inaction from the IBR, the Sawhoyamaxa
grew tired of waiting for their pending land claim and filed against Paraguay
with the Inter-American Court in 2005.138 The landowners responded with
“admitting the ridiculous and absurd claim made by the applicants would
seriously and irreparably impair the economic interests of a company in full
development.”139 Ultimately, the Court found Paraguay in violation of
multiple articles of the American Convention on Human Rights due to the
abject poverty, disease, and death suffered by the Sawhoyamaxa Community
as a result of their forced removal from their lands.140
The Inter-American Court remarked that its “procedures observed
[for evaluating evidence] are not subject to the same formalities as those
required in domestic judicial actions.”141 This flexibility “must be effected
paying special attention to the circumstances of the specific case, and bearing
in mind the limits set by respect for legal certainty and for the procedural
equality of the parties.”142 The Inter-American Court took “into account
international precedent, according to which international courts are deemed
to have authority to appraise and assess evidence based on the rules of a
reasonable credit and weight analysis”—in other words, it applied a
balancing test similar to that mandated by FRE 403, which calls for the courts
to weight the probative value of the evidence provided.143 The InterAmerican Court tends to err on the side of allowing rather than excluding
evidence and has “always avoided rigidly setting the quantum of evidence
required to reach a decision. This criterion is especially valid with respect to
international human rights courts…to assess the evidence submitted to them
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concerning the pertinent facts, in accordance with the rules of logic and
based on experience.”144
The Inter-American Court accepts oral statements into evidence
“inasmuch as they are in accordance with the object thereof.”145 Statements
“given by the alleged victims[’] next of kin,” barred in U.S. courts by the
hearsay doctrine, “may provide useful information on the alleged violations
and the consequences thereof.”146 When Paraguay challenged the validity of
some of the community’s testimony, the Court dismissed the concerns by
explaining the purpose behind allowing the style of testimony offered by the
indigenous party. The Sawhoyamaxa Community’s statements “regarding
their situation and living conditions, may contribute to the determination of
such facts” and a complete picture of the case’s context could not materialize
if it were excluded.147
The Court additionally relied upon anthropological studies of the
Sawhoyamaxa Community presented by expert witnesses.148 Although these
reports are written documents, not oral evidence, they recounted oral
histories describing the generations of land dispossession, forced
resettlement, Christianization, and other trials the indigenous people of the
Gran Chaco faced over the last century.149 Through these reports, the Court
considered how the Sahoyamaxa Community maintained their precolonization relationship to their traditional lands to the point where they
defied the encroaching ranchers by crossing their fences so that “the men
[could] hunt and fish, and the women [could] gather fruit and honey.”150 The
Court evaluated this documented history along with the community leaders’
pleas for “their right as members of the original people from t[hat] area [to]
be given back a part of what had once belonged to [their] ancestors.”151
Rebuking Paraguay’s challenge to the acceptance of these oral
histories, the Court wrote that it analyzed the community’s testimony “as a
whole with the rest of the body of evidence, applying thereto the standards
of reasonable credit and weight analysis and taking into consideration the
comments submitted by the State.”152 The Court did not allow the
Sawhoyamaxa Community’s testimony unconditionally as Paraguay
suggested. Instead, the Court considered its merit in light of the totality of
circumstances surrounding the case and concluded that the testimony was
admissible because of its probative value for the case.
As another example, an expert witness who interviewed sick
members of the community and their next of kin to document the Paraguayan
government’s neglect had little in the way of hard data because of the
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community's lack of medical records or written documents.153 This made
“obtain[ing] further supporting evidence” an “actual impossibility,” and so
Paraguay’s calls for a heightened evidentiary burden of proof, in the Court’s
view, compromised procedural parity to the detriment of the Sawhoyamaxa
party.154 This holistic take on the parties’ relative positions influenced which
pieces of evidence the Court accepted.
Paraguay attempted to discredit the negligence accusation through
alternate explanations for the indigenous people’s deaths. Yet, since the
government failed to support its statements with any form of documentation
and merely stated the contrary to what the Sawhoyamaxa Community
alleged, the Court considered Paraguay’s claims to be unsubstantiated.155 As
a result, the Court gave preference to the indigenous people’s oral account
of the deaths as the best evidence available. Putting the burden on Paraguay
to disprove the oral testimony of the Sawhoyamaxa Community was not only
a reasonably light burden for a government whose civic duty it is to
document and record medical issues and deaths among its citizens, but also
resulted in fair procedural treatment in face of the impossible task for the
illiterate community to produce written documents.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado
Trinidade cautioned against burdening “the ostensibly weaker party, wanting
the means for surviving with a minimum of dignity” with an unrealistic
standard of evidence for land claims.156 He described the challenges
indigenous people face in proving land possession or title as an example of
probatio diabolica (devil’s proof), or a legal requirement to obtain
impossible proof.157 Judge Cançado Trinidade described how this evidence
law concept existed in Roman law with respect to land possession and title,
and explained that the jurisprudence lives on in the present where probatio
diabolica “is entirely inadmissible in the area of International Human Rights
Law.”158 Just as the Romans could comprehend the uphill battle untitled
landholders faced in a judiciary system focused on written documentation,
so does the Inter-American Court recognize the challenges indigenous
people face in bringing forth valid evidence for land claims.159 The Court
uses its broad evidence admission powers to even the playing field between
indigenous parties that rely on authoritative oral evidence and settler parties
that rely on authoritative written evidence.
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B. Mayagna Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua
Like the previous case, Mayagna Awas Tingni involves private
enterprise acquiring control of an indigenous group’s land. The Awas Tingni
Community lives along the northernmost part of the Miskito Coast in an
autonomous region of Nicaragua called the Northern Atlantic Autonomous
Region.160 They regard multiple hills in the region as sacred burial and
ceremonial sites. Nicaragua believed the area to be under its direct possession
and the Awas Tingni Community could not challenge the state because it held
no formal title to the land. The Nicaraguan government established a “forest
management plan” with logging development firms MADENSA and
SOLCARSA by granting them a thirty-year concession for use of the Awas
Tingni Community’s land.161 At first, the logging firms appeared civil in their
pursuit of profit by signing an agreement with the Awas Tingni Community
whereby the firms agreed to sustainably preserve the forested lands and
maintain respect for the Awas Tingni Community’s communal land. Yet, after
the firms began felling trees in areas that violated its environmental permit,
such as part of the forest that belonged to the neighboring Kukulaya
Community, Awas Tingni leaders decided to take precautions to prevent
encroachment on its land.162
The community leaders asked the government to survey the
community’s land in order to demarcate it officially and safeguard it by
granting the community a formal title (the Nicaraguan government has the
power to legally recognize communally held indigenous land) and also
challenged the logging concession’s constitutionality in court. Yet despite a
ruling by the Supreme Court to that effect (declaring the concession
unconstitutional), the logging company continued to operate on the land, and
the Awas Tingni Community went to court a second time. This proved
disastrous; the Supreme Court declared the complaint inadmissible since it
was technically filed too late.163 With no other recourse left, the community
went to the Inter-American Commission. The Inter-American Court
eventually found Nicaragua in violation of American Convention Article 25
(right to judicial protection) for not enforcing the first judgement,164 and
Article 21 (right to private property) over the government’s failure to
recognize and protect the Awas Tingni Community’s ancestral land.165
As with the previous case, the Inter-American Court used a holistic
approach to evaluate admitted evidence. The Court allowed multiple leaders
of the Awas Tingni Community to testify in order to explain the community’s
relationship to the land. Jaime Castillo Felipe was a syndic of the group
responsible for resolving conflicts within the community and acting as a
liaison with Nicaraguan authorities. He explained that his people were “the
160
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owners of the land which they inhabit because” the community has “historical
places” in the region and “their work takes place in that territory.”166 This
work included local agriculture, fishing, and long hunting trips into the
wilderness lasting more than two weeks, during which the hunters carefully
select the animals they hunt and the food they gather so that the forest is not
depleted.167 Mr. Felipe could also recognize and name every member of the
community and their non-Awas Tingni neighbors, which roughly
corresponded with the borders of their communal land.168
According to Mr. Felipe’s testimony, the disputed land was occupied
and used by everyone in the community and “nobody owns the land
individually; the land’s resources are collective. If a person does not belong
to the Community, that person cannot utilize the land… To deny the use of
the land to any member of the Community, the matter has to be discussed and
decided by the Community Council.” Mr. Felipe also explained the way the
community transmits property from one to another by next-of-kin relations,
but how land is a strict exception to this rule: “since lands are collective
property of the community, there is no way that one member can freely
transmit to another his or her rights in connection with the use of the land.”
Mr. Felipe admitted that his ancestors may not have obtained any title
deed to the land, but recalled that when the logging firms signed their
agreement with the Awas Tingni Community to respect its traditional land,
he and other leaders were confident that they “had a property right recognized
by the Central Government and by the National Government” because they
“had lived on them for over 500 years.”169 Another community leader
explained that when the leaders signed the forest management agreement,
they drew up a map of the communally-held lands to clear up any ambiguity
and explained to the logging firms that they had title to the lands through
historical possession.170 Other admitted testimony included the names of the
sacred hills the community uses for religious ceremonies and for planting
special fruit trees. When members of the community pass through these areas,
“which date 300 centuries, according to what [one witness’s] grandfather
said,” they walk “in silence as a sign of respect for their dead ancestors, and
they greet Asangpas Muigeni, the spirit of the mountain, who lives under the
hills.”171 Nicaragua challenged these evidentiary submissions:
Almost all the expert witnesses presented by [t]he
Commission recognized that they had no direct knowledge of
the claim to ancestral lands made by the Awas Tingni
Indigenous Community; in other words, they recognized that
their professional opinions were based on studies carried out
by other persons… [T]hey should not be admitted as
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scientific evidence to substantiate an accusation of nontitling of ancestral lands.172
In evaluating the evidence before it, the Court again referenced
Article 44 of its Rules of Procedure in allowing both the Awas Tingni
Community and Nicaragua to present relevant materials and information.173
The Court elaborated that “[s]o as to obtain the greatest possible number of
items of evidence, this Court has been very flexible in admitting and
evaluating them…The non-requirement of formalities in admission and
evaluation of evidence are fundamental criteria for its evaluation, as evidence
is assessed rationally and as a whole.”174
The Court found that the Awas Tingni Community did not have a real
property deed to its claimed lands and that the agreement they signed with the
logging firms was a valid binding contract.175 Yet, according to the Court, the
Nicaraguan government’s own neglect caused the community’s hardship in
failing to obtain a land title. It criticized Nicaragua for lacking “an effective
mechanism for titling and demarcation of indigenous lands” despite its
obligations to do so under the American Convention and its guarantee to
recognize communal indigenous property according to the 1986 Nicaraguan
Constitution.176 Granting the logging concession without implementing
measures that protected the rights of the Awas Tingni Community to enjoy
their land “according to their traditional patterns of use and occupation”
constituted a breach of Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention.177 The
Court wrote:
172
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The Community has no formal title nor any other instrument
recognizing its right to the land where they live and where
their cultural and subsistence activities take place, even
though it has been requesting it from the State for years.
Since 1987, Nicaragua has granted no title deeds at all to
indigenous communities. The situation of the Community
has continued despite efforts made since 1991 to attain
demarcation and titling of their traditional land. The State
has been negligent and arbitrary in the face of the titling
requests by the Community…The principle of estoppel does
not allow the State to argue that the Community has no
legitimate claim based on traditional or historic land
tenure...178
To remedy this and comply with the American Convention, the Court
advised Nicaragua to “adopt in its domestic law the necessary legislative,
administrative, or other measures to create an effective mechanism for
delimitation and titling of the property of the members of the Awas Tingni
Mayagna Community, in accordance with the customary law, values, customs
and mores of that Community.” The Court later explained how the indigenous
party’s testimony informed its reading of the property rights involved in the
case:
[The Awas Tingni Community has] a communitarian
tradition regarding a communal form of collective property
of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not
centered on an individual but rather on the group and its
community. [This confers] the right to live freely in their
own territory…For indigenous communities, relations to the
land are not merely a matter of possession and production but
a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy,
even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future
generations…Indigenous peoples’ customary law must be
especially taken into account for the purpose of this analysis.
As a result of customary practices, possession of the land
should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title
to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that
property, and for consequent registration.179
The evidence presented to the Court by the community proved
probative enough to inform the Court of the nature of the property right the
Awas Tingni Community enjoyed without a written land title. The Count
concluded that the community had a communal property right to the disputed
land under article 5 of the Nicaraguan Constitution and that the government
had an obligation to accurately survey and grant the community title to its
land.180
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U.S. courts may already have the ability to admit the same kinds of
evidence as the Inter-American Court, even with their stricter evidence
standards. Whether the focus is on admitting expert witnesses,181 direct oral
testimony, or anthropological reports, there is debate over the limits of U.S.
judges’ discretion in admitting traditionally unusual forms of evidence.182 The
persuasiveness of cultural arguments is still an uphill battle in most courts that
view such statements as indicative of a party’s position rather than as an
informer of context.183 Norwegian courts on the other hand embrace values of
cultural sensitivity when doing so proves useful in obtaining justiciable
outcomes or vindicating public policy. The Selbu Case is the landmark
Norwegian decision that applied the above in the context of reforming its
indigenous rights jurisprudence.
V. Considering Customary Law: Norway
The history of Sámi-settler relations, sharing similarities with the
history of Native American-settler relations, reveals a struggle between
preserving Sámi customary law as a separate respected authority and adopting
non-Sámi legal regimes in the hopes of securing legal rights recognized by
the Scandinavian governments. The road to reforming settler society legal
regimes has been difficult for the Sámi. In Norway’s Supreme Court
(Høyesterett) and Sweden’s Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen), the results
have been mixed for Sámi litigants and similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Native American jurisprudence–a complex dance of precedents. Justices
continue to rely upon archaic laws that the Norwegian or Swedish
governments fashioned when their policy towards the inhabitants of Sápmi
reflected colonial ambitions and prioritized assimilation, resulting in a legal
framework that blatantly disregarded indigenous Sámi legal systems or
practices.
A. The Sámi Struggle for Courts’ Deference
In the Reindeer Grazing cases of 2002, a Swedish Court of Appeal
placed the burden of proof on Sámi reindeer herders to show that they
customarily and consistently used the disputed land.184 The court demanded
written evidence of reindeer migrations or Sámi presence in the area—without
interruption by non-Sámi settlers. Yet accumulating such evidence was an
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impossible task for the Sámi.185 The Sámi made agreements over land use
orally, with little or no written documentation. They also never had a need to
document the migrations of their reindeer herds because reindeer roam in
irregular patterns that the Sámi learn through collective traditional knowledge
passed down via intergenerational transmission.186 The Swedish court
acknowledged that the disputed lands were grazing pastures, but still wanted
documented evidence of continuous settlement despite the nomadic nature of
reindeer herding and the long breaks of time between instances of land use in
any specific pasture.187 Furthermore, the Sámi practiced sustainable living
habits that left few traces of their habitation in a pasture once they began
migrating to a new area.188 The Swedish court’s demands disregarded the
Sámi’s specialized knowledge and their patterns of land use by asking them
to satisfy elements of proof that favored Swedish settler society standards of
habitation.
Across the border in the Norwegian Aursunden case of 1997, the
Høyesterett relied heavily on judgements from a century ago (1897) in
resolving a reindeer herding land dispute because “the courts were
considerably closer to the evidence” then.189 Yet the racism and bias inherent
in these early decisions is plainly clear. They relied upon Lapp Commission
reports, using language such as “the farmer, during his hard and difficult
cultivating work, often carries hard burdens, while the Lapp, whose lifestyle
changes from hardship to laziness, usually escape those.”190 Despite these
problematic decisions, more recent ones introduce a new chapter of Sámisettler relations, and it is from these newer cases that U.S. courts may
extrapolate a favorable indigenous evidence policy.
B. The Selbu Case: A Norwegian First
Five years after Aursunden, in Jon Inge Sirum v. Esslan Reindeer
Pasturing District (also known as The Selbu Case), another reindeer grazing
rights case the Høyesterett relied on Sámi testimony and refashioned its
analysis to take into account Sámi cultural realities.191 The court ruled that the
Sámi had grazing rights over the privately-held lands in question since the
traditional standards used to denote land use were rejected in favor of Sámisensitive criteria.192 Although not citing Sámi customary law directly,
Norway’s highest court nonetheless preserved aspects of Sámi customary law
in its favorable ruling.193 The court analyzed the legislative intent of the
Lagting (Norway’s quasi-upper house in Parliament) to inform the meaning
185
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of the Reindeer Husbandry Act and came to the conclusion that in situations
where a dispute arises about whether reindeer grazing is allowed in an area
lying within an approved reindeer pasturing district, the burden of proof lies
on the landowner to show that the Sámi have abandoned the use of that land
by a preponderance of the evidence.194
This marked a change in Norwegian law because, previously, it was
the Sámi who had been required to prove that they held disputed land use
rights (in line with the standard in Sweden). The court also amended the
standards for land use to better reflect Sámi lifestyles. The test applied to
decide whether the Sámi party had usufructuary rights over grazing land was
no longer permanent use or even regular yearly land use. As the court
explained, the test must take into account how “the reindeer makes use of
huge areas… a typical pasturing pattern is that reindeer roam… Thus the
acquisition of a right cannot be excluded solely because it is what is called
‘occasional pasturing’ that has taken place.”195 The court called into question
the validity of Lapp Commission reports used in previous judgements given
that the Lapp Commission had no Sámi representation, was composed of
Norwegian farmers, and catalogued information collected by permanent
settler residents, not nomadic Sámi inhabitants.196 The court referred to Sámi
oral accounts which it said “cannot be generally rejected. And where they are
supported by other information, they may be given increased weight.”197 The
Sámi used organic materials to create turf huts that decomposed once they
migrated to a new area, and so it would be “difficult to find physical traces of
reindeer husbandry” and a lack of physical evidence of Sámi habitation could
not prove land disuse.198
By factoring in all of this evidence, the Høyesterett rendered a
decision that honored Sámi land use rights by partially using Sámi cultural
knowledge and customary law in lieu of Norwegian written documentation
that misrepresented Sámi practices and lifestyles. The Høyesterett changed its
evidentiary procedures to take into account indigenous knowledge and acted
in accordance with Norway’s human rights mandate under international
law.199 The Høyesterett also made it possible for the Sámi to preserve their
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customary law in their internal communities knowing that it is more likely to
be respected and observed in non-Sámi courts.
The Svartskog case likewise concerned Sámi rights to uncultivated
land in a valley named Svartskog in Norwegian and Čáhput in Sámi. The
Høyesterett granted the Sámi party collective property rights with the
rationale that the inhabitants maintained use of the land customarily and in
good faith.200 The ruling goes beyond the Selbu case in that it grants rights to
an unspecified group consisting of the entire population of the Svartskog area,
rather than limited to individually named parties (outside of the United States
where class actions are not a universally accepted legal concept, this is quite
a feat).201 The Høyesterett’s deference to Sámi cultural practices did not
require any new legislation but simply acceptance of a new judicial canon,
namely, interpretation of the law in the best light possible for indigenous
communities.
United States courts are already well-poised to employ this canon.
For instance, state and federal courts may draw persuasive authority from the
large body of developed jurisprudence in tribal court systems in order to work
culturally-appropriate standards into cases concerning Native Americans.202
Doing so can help integrate our nation’s tribal court systems easily with our
state and federal court systems, so that Native Americans may obtain
justiciable outcomes on terms favorable to them when it matters most.
VI. Conclusion: Where We Go From Here
The evidentiary methods by which Canada, the Inter-American
Court, and Norway handle oral histories and native customs and practices can
aid American courts in approaching the legal issues and challenges Native
Americans face. These methods not only address cultural biases that inform
American judges’ treatment of Native American parties203 but also enlighten
and expand our legal tradition to appreciate the sociocultural realities of this
land’s first inhabitants.
The United States has many choices in deciding how to allow Native
American oral history into evidence in its courts. Our current evidence laws
are satisfactory enough, if judges interpret FRE 802(20) more permissively.
Other possibilities exist if we broaden our scope to include what foreign
judiciary systems employ in similar situations. We could follow the example
of Canada and reinterpret existing hearsay and best evidence rules in light of
rights by granting them rights to reindeer husbandry “from time immemorial”, only
in the event that Norwegian protections fail Sámi can they invoke these
international conventions in their dispute with private landowners.
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the historical realities surrounding the context of pre-colonial forms of
authoritative knowledge, developed when Native Americans held sovereign
aboriginal title over their lands. We could honor Native American oral
histories through the allowance of expert evidence from indigenous leaders
and anthropologists, the way the Inter-American Court does. Our judges could
also review the cultural customs and practices of our indigenous populations
and discretely rule in ways that complement or favor Native American parties
for just outcomes the way Norwegian courts do. Ultimately, our judiciary
should seek a solution to this pervasive issue by fulfilling our government’s
duty of trust toward Native American nations whose legal existence and
limited sovereignty operate under American authority. Allowing Native
Americans increased access to the nation’s courts by admitting evidence that
respects their cultural forms of knowledge would constitute a step in that
direction.

